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EDITORIAL 
Behavioural Perspectives on Bank Misdeeds 
‘Lead us not into temptation’ 
Economists’ analytical viewpoint on behavioural matters, as notably characterised by Gary 
Becker, the Nobel prize winner, are very different from that commonly expressed by most 
other commentators.  Thus, the economist sees individuals as trying to maximise their utility, 
based on weighing the benefits of any particular action against the costs of that action.  In the 
case of an action which is illegal and/or disreputable, the cost will relate to the probability of 
detection of that action interacting with the penalty imposed, if and when caught.  The public, 
however, sees such actions in a rather different light, in the context of culture, ethics and 
moral values.  Thus, discussion of issues such as putting profits and bonuses before the 
interest of clients, and/or price manipulation of benchmarks for the benefit of the trader, is 
often described as being the result of ‘rotten apples’, or even ‘a whole barrel of rotten apples’.  
There is, however, some greater overlap between these two viewpoints than may appear at 
first glance, but the overlap is somewhat limited.  For example, one of the costs of taking an 
action that may have a pecuniary benefit for oneself, but which one accepts as being morally 
wrong, may be that the perpetrator has a personal cost in the form of guilt or shame.  That 
self-assessment will probably, in turn, be significantly affected by how others around one, 
one’s peer group, are responding to the same set of incentives, and this is how ‘culture’ can 
enter, somewhat through the back door, see Lo (2015) on ‘The Gordon Gekko Effect: The 
Role of Culture in the Financial Industry’.  Social scientists, outside of economics, tend to 
stress such peer-group, cultural influences on individual decisions.  Economists, on the other 
hand, usually believe that direct personal incentives are more powerful.  Indeed, there may 
even be some who actually find an extra pleasure from ‘beating the system’.  And almost all 
of us have limits to the extent that we will do the ‘right thing’ if the benefits of not doing so 
are clear and the direct costs of the action seem minimal.   
Let me give a personal example.  The other week I purchased a return ticket on the Heathrow 
Express.  On the way back, rather late, there was no ticket inspector.  But the train company 
had fulfilled its contract with me, to bring me back after taking me there, and I should, 
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morally speaking, have torn up my return ticket.  I did not; in fact at the time I felt pleasure at 
having saved money.  In a very real sense, however, I had defrauded the rail company and my 
fellow taxpayers.  I wonder how many readers would not reuse a return railway ticket which 
had not been processed.  I rather doubt that many would tear up their return ticket under 
similar conditions.   
 
Let me give a similar example.  There was a discussion, involving the then Chancellor Ed 
Balls, prior to the May 2015 election.  The question was whether a payer, asked to make a 
payment in cash, should request a written receipt from the payee, in order to check 
(widespread) evasion of VAT?  This proposal was widely regarded as implausible.  Similarly, 
the Syriza Government in Greece suggested at one stage that tourists should be encouraged to 
act as tax inspectors.  What that really meant was that tourists should be asked to record and 
report all cases in which they were specifically asked to pay in cash rather than by some 
recorded electronic or paper-based mechanism.  The aim again was to constrain evasions of 
VAT.  Again that idea was regarded as verging on the ridiculous.  There are very few of us, 
and certainly not including myself, who can claim total moral rectitude.  We are, almost all, 
(utilitarian) sinners, and exhortation to do, or to be, good will have only, in most cases, minor 
effect.   
 
Such issues arise particularly among professional services.  Asymmetric knowledge, which 
enables the better informed to rip-off the worse informed, is a natural concomitant of 
professional services; why else go to them?  The potential for such rip-offs occur naturally in 
professional services; have you never wondered whether your dentist, or your garage, is 
prescribing a more expensive repair than is strictly necessary?   
 
There are a number of remedies for dealing with asymmetric knowledge.  These are: 
Repetition, Reputation, Dual capacity and Design of system. Let me make a few comments 
about the last three of these.  The importance of reputation is clear, and in the case of banks, 
this would have been well-known to the Board and senior management.  A problem is that 
the reputation of the bank would not have been of much, if any, importance or value to the 
trader or bank official undertaking the dubious action; particularly if that trader or official 
was expecting to move from that bank to some other job in the relatively near future.   
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The usage of dual capacity is a means of trying to defuse the problem of asymmetric 
knowledge.  This is done by separating diagnosis of what may be wrong, and what may be 
needed, from execution of the necessary act to improve the situation.  Thus, if one has an 
expensive repair to do on one’s house, or one’s body, or one’s asset portfolio, one can call in 
an expert to advise one on the best course of action, but then state in advance that that course 
of action will be put out to tender for competition to be done by executive agents other than 
the initial adviser.  The problem with this is that it is extremely expensive, because one is 
employing two sets of agents for an exercise that could be done by one.  Nevertheless, if the 
exercise is sufficiently important to one’s health or wealth, then one usually does use dual 
capacity, with diagnosis separated from execution.  This was the practice in the UK stock 
market, with brokers separated from jobbers, until the mid-1980s.  More generally, in order to 
save costs, single, rather than dual, capacity has become more general in financial markets.  
Would it be worth reverting in some cases to a dual capacity system in order to enhance trust 
in financial markets? 
 
Finally on this topic, let me note that systems can be well, or badly, designed for limiting, or 
encouraging, bad behaviour.  In particular, much of banks’ wrong-doing has been related to 
the manipulation of benchmarks.  The provision of benchmarks was entirely unnecessary 
from the viewpoint of the banks, and the traders within the banks.  The purpose of having a 
benchmark is to provide clients, again who are relatively poorly informed, with an idea of 
what the normal basic price of an asset was on some particular day.  So the exercise of doing 
such a benchmark was for the benefit of clients, not for the banks themselves.  Such 
benchmarks were extremely badly designed, from the viewpoint of maintaining high 
standards.  They related to the potential price at which an asset could be traded at a particular 
pre-notified point of time.  This was almost an invitation to manipulation.   
 
Again let me give an example.  Assume that there is a particular doorway, and you are told 
that you have to live, forever afterwards, with the first person to come through that door at, 
say, 4 PM today.  Do you not think that, if it was possible, you would try to manipulate the 
identity of the person coming through that door at that particular time, if you were able to do 
so?  The whole idea of making a particular notional, (not actual), price at a particular single 
point of the day the focus of a large number of related transactions is inherently stupid.  It 
should not have been too difficult to reform in a high volume, particularly electronic, market.  
Why cannot the authorities average out the transaction prices in such markets over a short 
4 
 
period, with that period varying randomly within, say, the penultimate hour of the market’s 
operations.  Supervisors should be trained to assess where the system itself provides an 
invitation to manipulation.  It is easier to reform systems than to reform human behaviour.   
 
‘But deliver us from evil’ 
 
How should one attempt to design a system that will protect against fraud and immoral 
manipulation?  There are many potential routes; one of these is to check whether there is a 
sufficient oversight system and then to penalise the manager of the fraudster, as much as the 
perpetrator.  The rationale for this is that the perpetrator will get the benefit, and will then 
internalise the costs, while the fraudster’s manager will not get the benefit.  But if the latter 
has to bear much of the costs, he (or she) will become much more careful to oversee and 
supervise the trading arrangements in order to ensure that fraud, with its associated costs on 
the manager if caught, does not occur.   
 
How does one do this?  The standard answer is to get each manager to sign a document 
stating that he (or she) has installed and examined sufficient internal controls to prevent fraud 
and manipulation.  This is the general line of attack which has been introduced, for example 
in New Zealand.  The exemplary jail sentence (14 years) imposed in July 2015 on Hayes for 
rigging the TIBOR benchmark was clearly meant to change the utilitarian calculus of others 
in the market.  It probably will have little success in so doing, for several reasons:- 
 In the interim Hayes earned millions, far more than the average worker over several 
life-times. 
 The probability of getting caught and hauled up in court remains minuscule. 
 The exemplary sentence was so far out of line with prior norms that it may well get 
reduced on appeal, and/or early parole will be allowed. 
A far greater effect would have been achieved had it been possible to impose a (much lower) 
penalty on Hayes’ line-managers for negligence. 
 
Of course, imposing a cost on managers, who would therefore be more careful to prevent 
fraud, manipulation, etc., could lead the trader to try to collude with the overseeing manager.  
But apart from the fact that this would spread the financial benefits of the improper 
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behaviour, it would again be necessary to go one step higher and to impose costs on the 
manager’s manager, and so if there is collusion, always go one step higher with the costs.  
Ultimately one could go as high as the Chairman.   
 
A question that I leave for further consideration, is whether external supervisors, e.g. in 
central banks and FSAs, should equally be required to make similar attestations.  Should the 
supervisor be asked to sign a statement that they have examined the internal control 
procedures of the bank that they supervise, and that they have checked and found it 
satisfactory?  Just as the economist would worry about the incentive structure facing the bank 
official, so we will also worry about the incentive structure facing the supervisors.  What, 
indeed, is the cost/benefit, incentive structure for those working in the PRA/FSA, FCA, etc.?   
 
Essentially, we need better incentive structures throughout.  There are a number of steps that 
could be taken in this respect and some that have been.  An example of a revised incentive is 
the current proposals and requirements for claw-backs in the event that bad behaviour is 
subsequently identified.  But there are further alternative measures that could be taken to 
improve prudence and better behaviour.  Let me mention three.   
 
The first would be to pay bonuses in bail-inable bonds, rather than either in cash or equity.   
 
The second could be to remove limited liability from key decision-makers; not perhaps a 
complete return to unlimited liability, but to require, say, an uncalled provision to make large 
payments in cases of losses or fraud for certain categories of senior officials and major 
decision-makers on the trading floor.   
 
Yet another potential reform, would be to change the governance structure of banks to make 
them responsive to a wider group of stakeholders and not just to equity shareholders, who 
have, again because of limited liability, a built-in incentive to encourage greater risk-taking 
than would be socially optimal.  On this latter, see Haldane (2015), ‘Who owns a Company?’ 
 
The present penalty for bank misbehaviour of imposing massive fines on the banks has no 
logic either in design nor in outcome.  While the fines do encourage top management to 
introduce stronger internal control mechanisms, it has no effect on the incentives facing the 
individual on the trading floor.  Moreover, the incentive for top management to introduce 
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tougher controls is balanced by the effect of the fines in reducing the capital buffer of the 
bank, and therefore its ability to intermediate between savers and borrowers.  There is a 
general appreciation of the point that the cost of bad behaviour should impact on the 
individuals responsible rather than the institution, and that imposing the cost on the institution 
has probably net negative social value.   
 
Throughout this note I have tried to emphasize the importance of the incentives facing the 
individual decision-maker, rather than of culture or ethics.  Is it better to think as an 
economist rather than a moralist?  Should we try to improve the design of the financial 
system to reduce the incentives for bad behaviour, rather than to change people, since we all 
have ‘original sin’? 
 
In this respect, I was struck by the proposed individual conduct rules in Box 12 of page 61, of 
the Final Report of the Fair and Effective Market Review,  
 
 Rule 1:  You must act with integrity. 
 Rule 2:  You must act with due skill, are and diligence. 
 Rule 3:  You must be open and co-operative with the FCA, the PRA and other 
regulators. 
 Rule 4:  You must pay due regard to the interests of customers and treat them fairly. 
 Rule 5:  You must observe proper standards of market conduct. 
 Rule 6:  ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’. 
 Rule 7:  Always remember to say please and thank you. 
 Rule 8:  Always wipe your feet after coming in off the street. 
 
The keen-eyed will perhaps have noted that I have added the last three rules myself.  But I 
think that they would probably be as effective, or ineffective, as the first five.  We get 
exhorted notably on Sundays, if we go to church, to behave better.  No doubt that helps a bit, 
but we really need is to structure incentives so that we are not encouraged to behave badly.  
Such a restructuring remains unfinished business. 
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